OPRA: An Open-Source Online Preference Reporting and Aggregation System by Chen, Yiwei et al.
OPRA: An Open-Source Online Preference Reporting and Aggregation System
Video at: youtube.com/watch?v=O56L233rr84
Yiwei Chen1 , Jingwen Qian1 , Junming Wang2 , Lirong Xia1∗ and Gavriel Zahavi1
1Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute 2Stanford University
reedyka3@gmail.com, qianj2@rpi.edu, jumingw@cs.stanford.edu, xial@cs.rpi.edu,
gavriel.zahavi@gmail.com
Abstract
We introduce the Online Preference Reporting and
Aggregation (OPRA) system, an open-source on-
line system that aims at providing support for
group decision-making. We illustrate OPRA’s dis-
tinctive features: UI for reporting rankings with
ties, comprehensive analytics of preferences, and
group decision-making in combinatorial domains.
We also discuss our work in an automatic mentor
matching system. We hope that the open-source
nature of OPRA will foster development of com-
puterized group decision support systems.
1 Introduction
The field of social choice, sometimes referred to as group
decision-making or collective decision-making, aims at de-
signing mechanisms to help people make a joint decision,
despite that they may have conflicting preferences. Typical
examples of social choice are (1) voting, ranging from high-
stakes (e.g. presidential elections) to low-stakes (e.g. de-
ciding a restaurant for dinner) voting scenarios; and (2) re-
source allocation, ranging from high-stakes (e.g. allocating
resources among countries) to low-stakes (allocating course
projects to students).
In this paper, we introduce a system for online group
decision-making: the Online Preference Reporting and Ag-
gregation (OPRA) system,1 which has the following distinc-
tive features:
User interfaces for reporting rankings with ties. OPRA
provides 5 intuitive interfaces for users to rank the alterna-
tives with ties. In particular, the one-column and two-column
UIs allow users to report rankings with ties via drag-and-drop
operations.
Comprehensive analytics of preferences. In addition to
standard information and statistics about voting outcomes,
OPRA also computes and displays other consensus metrics,
such as clusters of preferences based on learning mixture of
Plackett-Luce models [Zhao et al., 2016], and margin of vic-
tory [Xia, 2012].
∗Contact Author
1site: opra.io; source code: github.com/PrefPy/opra
Group decision-making in combinatorial domains. OPRA
supports reporting of Conditional Preference Networks (CP-
nets) [Boutilier et al., 2004] for multi-issue voting [Lang and
Xia, 2016] and multi-type resource allocation [Mackin and
Xia, 2016].
Matching OPRA includes a system for automatic assignment
of student mentors to courses based on their preferences and
qualifications.
Open-source. OPRA is open-source, allowing easy modifi-
cation and customization for deployment, and easy adaptation
of its components to other systems.
2 Voting UIs
OPRA includes the following five UIs for users to report
weak orders over alternatives. (1) One-Column (Figure 1).
OPRA’s one-column UI is an extension of the widely-used
JQuery sortable class. Users perform drag-and-drop opera-
tions to achieve the rank order they desire [Li et al., 2019].
This UI supports ties among alternatives.(2) Two-Column.
The two-column UI is a variation of the one-column UI. The
left column is the same as one-column, and the right column
allows clicking operation to rank. the alternatives that remain
in the right column are submitted as unranked. (3) Sliders.
each alternative is ranked from 0 to 100 using a slider. (4)
Star Rating. each alternative is ranked from 0 to 10 using a
star rating UI. (5) Yes/No. each alternative is associated with
a checkbox allowing submission of approval vote.
Figure 1: OPRA’s one column voting UI.
3 Comprehensive Analytics of Preferences
OPRA computes and shows the results of some voting rules,
preference learning, and margin of victory.
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Commonly-studied voting rules. OPRA implements
commonly-studied voting rules, including Plurality, Borda,
k-Approval, Single Transferable Vote (STV), and others. For
a poll, each voting rule is applied. The result is displayed in a
table, and the winner can be seen under different voting rules
(Figure 2 below shows some rows from an example table).
While most voting rules are implemented using standard al-
gorithms based on their definitions, some voting rules’ imple-
mentation uses state-of-the-art algorithms proposed in recent
literature. For example, implementation of STV and Ranked
pairs computes all parallel universe tie-breaking (PUT) win-
ners [Conitzer et al., 2009] using a DFS-based algorithm
in [Wang et al., 2019].
Figure 2: An example of poll result table on OPRA. Here, Cherry
wins under Plurality, but Apple wins under Borda and Veto.
Margin of victory. OPRA computes and shows the margin of
victory [Magrino et al., 2011; Cary, 2011; Xia, 2012]. Mar-
gin of victory measures the robustness of the voting outcome,
and also plays an important role in post-election audits. The
higher the margin of victory is, the more robust the outcome
is.
Preference learning. OPRA implements the EGMM
method [Zhao et al., 2016] of learning mixtures of Plackett-
Luce model. Learned mixtures offer a high-level overview
of groups and strength of preferences based on users’ ordinal
preferences and can be used to make useful decisions such as
group activity selection [Darmann et al., 2012].
4 Group Decision-Making in Combinatorial
Domains
In a combinatorial domain, there are exponentially many al-
ternatives, each of which is characterized by its values on p
variables. For example, in combinatorial voting [Lang and
Xia, 2016], voters vote to decide approval/non-approval of p
issues. In multi-type resource allocation [Mackin and Xia,
2016], there are p types of items to be allocated to agents ac-
cording to their preferences.
The challenges in group decision-making in combinatorial
domains are: First, there are often exponentially many al-
ternatives/bundles of items, which makes it hard for users to
report their preferences. Second, it is unclear what mecha-
nisms should be applied when users use a compact language,
e.g. CP-nets as we will recall shortly, to represent their pref-
erences. See [Lang and Xia, 2016] for more discussions.
To address the first challenge, OPRA allows users sub-
mit CP-nets [Boutilier et al., 2004]. To address the second
challenge, OPRA supports sequential voting [Lang, 2007] on
multiple issues and sequential resource allocation of multiple
types of items, via the “Multi-Poll” section.
To execute sequential voting, OPRA allows users to ex-
press preferences either using a CP-net, indicating their con-
ditional preferences, or by waiting until previous sub-polls
finish, then submit their preferences over the current issue.
For sequential resource allocation, OPRA allows users to
use serial dictatorships to allocate indivisible items, when the
number of users is the same as the number of items.
5 Matching
OPRA offers an online Mentor application tool to automati-
cally assign student mentors to courses looking for mentors.
The matching is based on the kinds of mentors a course is
looking for, and the courses desired for mentoring by a stu-
dent. For each course, instructors and administrators are able
to modify the weights of its features (e.g. how important are
GPA, mentor experience, etc.), while from the student’s side,
they can submit their application form and their rankings of
courses. The personal features and course preferences will
be taken as their input of the matching algorithm. Adminis-
trators can also modify weights, add, remove, or fix students
through the ranking UI, and perform real-time re-matching.
Matching algorithm. For a given course, we calculate a stu-
dent’s score for that course as the dot product between the
course’s weight vector and the student’s feature vector. this
is done for each student, the resulting scores giving a prefer-
ence ranking for this course over all the students. we then use
these courses’ rankings over students and students’ (partial)
rankings over courses to perform a course-proposing Gale-
Shapley stable matching algorithm [Gale and Shapley, 1962]
(with courses also having a max capacity). This process can
be re-run by administrators at any time.
Explainable AI. The system also supports some Explainable
AI functionality [Ribera and Lapedriza, 2019]. From their
page, administrators can view reasons why a given student
was a assigned to a class or not. For example, a student wasn’t
assigned to the class because they were assigned to a higher-
ranked class instead, as seen in Figure 3.
Figure 3: An example of Explainable AI on OPRA.
6 Future Work
• Usability: Improve human computer interaction, such
as offering initial rankings to users without introducing
bias.
• Explainability: Add more comprehensive analytics and
statistics for the purpose of better explanations.
• Algorithms: Improve algorithms for polls to aid in
group activity selection and group decision making, as
well as improve matching algorithms to handle min-
max bounds to course capacity [Nasre and Nimbhorkar,
2017].
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